Standing Committee A

[Mr. Joe Benton in the Chair]

Crime (International Co-operation) Bill [Lords]

Clause 13 - Requests for assistance from overseas authorities

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 131, in
clause 13, page 8, line 17, leave out 'the territorial authority' and insert 'the UK Government'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 132, in 
clause 13, page 8, line 17, leave out second 'authority' and insert 'the Government'.
 Amendment No. 130, in 
clause 13, page 8, line 33, at end insert 
 'subject to the requirement that any modification to any such provisions or to the Treaty must be approved by both Houses of Parliament'.

Nick Hawkins: Good morning, Mr. Benton. I welcome you back to the Chair. It is interesting that the massed ranks of the Opposition outnumber the slightly less massed ranks of the Government. I am now tempted to call for a Division, but I am reluctant to put the Government Whip under such pressure. He has been so co-operative, and I hope that he will continue to be so. I hope also that he will note that I am not taking advantage of our temporary superiority in numbers. I will store it up as a favour to be cashed in on a future occasion.
 I shall refer briefly to what was said in another place on 23 January, when some pertinent remarks were made by my noble Friend Lord Carlisle of Bucklow, a distinguished former Minister in the days of the Conservative Government and a close personal friend. As always, being a distinguished and senior lawyer, Lord Carlisle alighted on some interesting points. When I first read the clause, I was puzzled about the phrase ''territorial authority''. I do not know whether members of the Committee have read clause 28(9), under which ''territorial authority'' is interpreted as the Secretary of State in England and Wales and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. 
 Unfortunately, the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) is not in Committee this morning, otherwise, as a distinguished Scottish lawyer himself, he could explain the role of the Lord Advocate. I do not propose to do so. I have no criticism to make of the Lord Advocate. I have picked up some Scots law in my time, but I am certainly not qualified in it. 
 I was worried that it would be only the Secretary of State who was regarded as the territorial authority in England and Wales. That is why we have suggested in the amendments that the United Kingdom Government be the territorial authority. There are strong rumours that the Government reshuffle will take place today, so it is particularly appropriate that we should be querying whether the territorial authority should be the Secretary of State alone or the entire UK Government. If the strong rumours in the press and the media over the past few days are true and that there will no longer be a Home Office and a Lord Chancellor's Department, but that a ministry of justice will be created, it makes it even more crucial to take into account what the Government may have in mind. No doubt the Minister is privy to at least some of what is being planned in the forthcoming reshuffle. I hope therefore that he might agree that it would be wise for the whole UK Government to be the territorial authority, not the Secretary of State.

David Heath: I am a little puzzled by the hon. Gentleman's argument. Under statute, the Secretary of States means the entire Government, not an individual Secretary of States. The Bill refers to the relevant Secretary of State for the purposes of enactment.

Nick Hawkins: That is what I wanted to tease out of the Minister. We need to be clear about what the Government have in mind. Territorial authority is a new concept. It does not appear in the preceding legislation. Clause 28(9) defines the territorial authority as the Secretary of State.

David Heath: I believe that ''territorial authority'' has been used in legislation since devolution. It is not unknown to British subjects.

Nick Hawkins: The hon. Gentleman is right that it has been used in more recent legislation since the devolution settlement, but it was not used at the time of the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990, which was in place pre-devolution. That is why I wanted to tease out such matters. As the hon. Gentleman understands, I am probing the Government, as well as teasing them and teasing them out.
 Under amendment No. 130, any modifications to the treaties should go through both Houses of Parliament. There is great sensitivity at the moment about the way in which the proposed new European constitution arising from the European convention is being described differently by Ministers. One Secretary of State refers to it merely as a tidying-up exercise. That is certainly not how Conservative Members perceive it. We think that, in whatever form it finally takes, it will be one of the most substantial proposed changes to the British constitutional position ever contemplated. That is why we are concerned about it. 
 This part of the Bill covers what may happen in the event of modifications to the treaty of the European Union. That is not purely a theoretical possibility, but something that is being considered now. There are strong suggestions that the Italian Government, for example, want a new treaty of Rome. They are 
 determined to push through the changes in the new European constitution in their forthcoming European presidency so that any new constitution or treaty should be another treaty of Rome. In the light of the proposed changes, and if there are to be modifications to the treaty of the European Union, it is vital that they go through both Houses of Parliament. 
 On 23 January in another place, Lord Carlisle of Bucklow said: 
''Clause 13 deals with requests from overseas for assistance by the courts in this country. Such requests must be received by the territorial authority for that part of the United Kingdom which is, by definition in Clause 28(9), the Secretary of State.''
 He then drew the distinction between that and the previous clauses that we debated earlier, and said: 
''under Clauses 7 and 8, if it is the other way round and the request comes from this country to another asking for its assistance in obtaining evidence, it can come directly from the judicial authority to the court in the country from which assistance is requested.''
 My noble Friend therefore asked the reasonable question: 
''Why must there be a system where a request from this country can go directly from the court to the court whereas a similar request from overseas cannot go directly to the court but to the Home Secretary who is required under Clause 15 to nominate a court to receive any such evidence?''
 He wanted to find out why there was that difference. Lord Goldsmith, the Attorney-General said: 
''At this end there are a number of different prosecuting authorities. The division between their jurisdiction is complex and based upon the type of crime involved. Therefore, it is much more difficult to identify who is necessarily the correct recipient for an incoming request.''
 I shall not read the whole of what the Attorney-General said, but that is the basis of his reply. He went on: 
''Territorial authority, a concept to which the noble Lord rightly draws attention, includes the devolved administrations. The territorial authority is the Secretary of State in England and Wales but is the Lord Advocate in Scotland. Enabling the request to be sent directly to the devolved administration will remove an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. That geographical division is straightforward and easy to explain.''
 We understand how the devolved settlement works, and I do not seek to unpick that; however, it would be much clearer if the clause referred to the UK Government, if there is a difference between the complexity of the courts in the one case and the simplicity of the requests going from court to court the other way round. 
 My noble Friend Lord Carlisle of Bucklow also raised his concern about the phrase ''administrative authority'', which appears in clause 1 but not in clause 13. He quoted from clause 13 and said: 
''Is that intended to include the administrative authority whose requests we can deal with in the service of overseas process? Why are the words different in the two clauses?''
 The Attorney-General replied: 
''They are different concepts and different functions . . . It does not seem to me that it needs to be the same. In the different context of service of process as opposed to gathering of evidence, the provisions make sense.''
 Lord Carlisle rightly said that he still found 
''the difference between Clause 13 and Clause 7 surprising so far as concerns the receipt for the request for evidence. It is difficult to see how adding in an extra stage—namely, having to go to the territorial authority—will save time. If we have enough confidence in the system in Clause 7 that requests to countries can go direct from our courts to their courts, we should enable them to be able to send requests directly to our courts rather than going through the Secretary of State.''
 The Attorney-General then said that clause 8 
''provides a choice . . . In the United Kingdom there will be prosecutors who cannot execute requests. Therefore, it would be wrong for requests to be sent to them.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, cols. GC 66–67.]
 That summary of the argument that took place in the other place shows that we are talking about quite complex provisions. I hope that the Minister will understand that the amendment is seriously probing whether there might be a clearer way to proceed. We could achieve clarity by ensuring, first, that all matters were dealt with by the Government, not just one Secretary of State, and, secondly, that if a change to the European treaties were likely, the change went through both Houses of Parliament. I hope that the Minister will understand, despite my gentle teasing at the opening of my remarks, that these are serious points that are to be taken seriously. 
 Although the Minister now has one or two reinforcements, he does not yet have all the seventh cavalry on his side, so I am sure that he will take his numerical difficulties seriously.

Bob Ainsworth: I was trying to think of all the motives that the hon. Gentleman could have for pressing an amendment to a Division at 9.10 am. One would be to prove that he is here—I know that that is difficult for him—and another would be to show his support for the new modernised hours of the House of Commons.
 The amendments would be a backward step. They would require all requests to be sent to the UK Government, and would prevent requests that relate to evidence located in Scotland being sent direct to the Lord Advocate, who is the person competent to deal with them. The expression ''territorial authority'' allows a distinction to be made between the role of the Secretary of State and the role of the Lord Advocate. The proposed change would not represent any progress, and would not adequately address the matter of devolution and Scotland's separate legal system. The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right that the phrase did not occur in the earlier legislation, which was passed in 1990—before devolution. 
 The issue of whether the provisions should mention the whole Government, and matters such as reshuffles and potential changes to the structure of government, are irrelevant. In this instance, ''Secretary of State'' does not necessarily mean the Home Secretary; in Northern Ireland, for instance, it means the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. There is collective responsibility, and responsibility for the appropriate Secretary of State, so I do not understand the hon. Gentleman's point about the whole of the UK Government, unless he is attempting, rather than pursuing his usual Euro sceptic line, to unpick the 
 devolution settlement. Although he says that that is not his intention and that he does not see that there is a problem, that would be the effect of his amendment. 
 Clause 28(9) defines territorial authorities. For England and Wales, the Secretary of State is the Home Secretary. If there were a reshuffle or a change in the structure of government, that would be reflected and the new Secretary of State—whoever it may be—would be designated as the authority. I have not been personally consulted about that, so I am disappointed. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister never summoned to ask, ''Parliamentary Under-Secretary, what do you think about this idea?'' I only wish that he had so that I could have made him aware of my views. 
 The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will deal with Northern Ireland requests at the Northern Ireland Office. For Scotland, the territorial authority is the Lord Advocate, which means that requests that relate to evidence located in Scotland will go directly the Lord Advocate's office. That reflects the devolution settlement, and what is practical and efficient. There is no value in the Secretary of State in London acting as a post box for requests aimed at Scotland or Northern Ireland. The 1990 Act required all requests to go first to the Secretary of State, but that was prior to devolution. 
 Amendment No. 130 would mean that any changes to the bodies competent to make requests under the treaty of the European Union will be subject to affirmative resolution. Currently, Eurojust is the only body that is able to make requests under that provision. Eurojust was established within the framework of the treaty of the European Union by a decision of the 1990 temporary council. That decision was subject to scrutiny by Committees of both Houses. If there were changes to the decision, or if a new body were set up, that would be subject to scrutiny by Parliament. If there were a new treaty, new legislation would be introduced, as happened with the Maastricht treaty—I remember that with fond memories. There is therefore no need to do what amendment No. 130 would do. If the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) has problems with the scrutiny arrangements agreed by Parliament, he should not take up that issue during a discussion on an amendment. I know that he has some concerns about scrutiny, which he raises from time to time—I accept that those views are valid. 
 Any changes to overarching treaty structure, as opposed to specific arrangements agreed under the treaty, will need to be ratified by means of primary legislation. The amendment is not necessary, and I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that Parliament will have full opportunity to scrutinise any structural changes to existing Community treaties. That includes changes to treaty structure following the forthcoming intergovernmental conference on the Convention on the Future of Europe, which will be subject to primary legislation. I therefore ask the hon. Gentleman to consider his amendment and be prepared to withdraw it in light of my strengthening position in the Committee.

Nick Hawkins: Now that the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton (Mr. Kilfoyle), who definitely represents the seventh cavalry, has arrived, the Minister is in a much more comfortable position.

Peter Kilfoyle: I would like to put on the record that I have been in the immediate environment of the Committee Room all the way through proceedings. I would not like it to be thought that I was tardy in my attendance this morning.

Nick Hawkins: Indeed. As the hon. Gentleman knows, I saw him in the House of Commons this morning before the Committee started and we exchanged a word or two. I knew he was here. I have to bear in mind one's knowledge of what may be happening just outside the Committee Room.
 The hon. Gentleman and I were in each other's company, with many hon. Members from all parties, watching the splendid England victory against Slovakia last night. I am always delighted to see the hon. Gentleman—we all are. I am especially delighted to hear his trenchant criticism of the Government when he feels that that is appropriate.

Joe Benton: Order. There is no need to prove the existence of the hon. Member for Liverpool, Walton. We will return to the amendment

Nick Hawkins: With great pleasure, Mr. Benton.
 I am genuinely grateful to the Minister for his reassurances on some of the matters that I raised, and I am particularly grateful for his confirmation that we were right to probe them. He is aware that there was, as I said, considerable and interesting debate in another place about these points. It is helpful that what the Minister said will be on the record. I do not seek to prolong the debate, although it has been useful. In light of the Minister's reassurances and the numerical changes, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 13 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 14 - Powers to arrange for evidence to be obtained

Nick Hawkins: I beg to move amendment No. 25, in
clause 14, page 8, line 40, leave out from beginning to end of line 3 on page 9.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 27, in 
clause 14, page 9, line 2, leave out 
 ', or intended to be carried on'.
 Amendment No. 28, in 
clause 14, page 9, line 3, at end insert— 
 '(1A) In this section ''administrative proceedings'' means proceedings that if carried on in the United Kingdom would be proceedings before a court.'.

Nick Hawkins: We are dealing with some serious points that were debated in another place on 23 January 2003. I shall refer in a moment not only to Lord Carlisle of Bucklow, who contributed on the
 subject, but to Baroness Anelay of St. Johns. One thing about that debate that was slightly different was that even Lord Clinton-Davis, on the Government's side, supported some of the points made by Baroness Anelay of St. Johns. That was a rarity, because during other debates in another place Lord Clinton-Davis was critical of some of the arguments advanced from the Conservative Benches. It was notable that he had some sympathy and support for our views in that debate.
 Before I deal with what was said in another place, I shall describe what we intend the amendments to do. Amendment No. 25 would delete clause 14(1)(b) and (c), so that the clause would apply only to criminal investigations. We have a problem, with which the Minister is familiar from some of the debates on the Extradition Bill, about the concept of administrative proceedings. Amendments Nos. 27 and 28 would provide alternative ways to address some of the same issues. Amendment No. 27 says that one could omit the passage that looks to the future of the clemency proceedings. There was an interesting debate in another place about what clemency proceedings were, during which even the Attorney-General, who is a distinguished lawyer, for once got into some confusion. 
 Amendment No. 28 would provide another option by explaining what are administrative proceedings. In another place, Lord Renton of Mount Harry and Baroness Carnegy of Lour got into a debate with the Attorney-General and the Government accepted our amendment No. 127. It is always a happy result when a Conservative amendment in either House is accepted by the Government. I hope that the Minister will follow the precedent that was set by the Attorney-General by accepting more of our amendments. 
 One of the points that Lord Carlisle of Bucklow made in another place was not answered by the Attorney-General and, having set out what amendments Nos. 25, 27 and 28 do, I want to refer to some of the things that were said in that interesting and important debate. 
 Baroness Anelay of St. Johns pointed out that there had been some debate about administrative proceedings in the debate in another place on clause 1. She wanted to explore exactly what administrative proceedings and clemency proceedings are here. She was probing the precise nature of the definitions, and she moved amendment No. 127 in another place, which changed the words ''removal of a penalty'' to 
''removal or reduction of a penalty''.
 That was the Conservative amendment that the Government happily accepted in another place. 
 Baroness Anelay said that she hoped that the Attorney-General would 
''also be able to explain whether the definition of clemency proceedings is intended to extend the scope of the Bill's provisions, not just to the death penalty case but to other cases in which the power of clemency is exercised, such as a reduction in the length of a prison sentence.''
 Lord Clinton-Davis intervened at that point, to say: 
''The words 'clemency proceedings' are used only in relation to the Schengen convention, and not in any other instrument of law in this country . . . I have never seen that expression before. Can my noble and learned friend''
 —the Attorney-General— 
''say whether a similar provision has been included in any other legislation?''
 With regard to clause 14(1)(c), Lord Carlisle then asked: 
''Why should not it be an application that relates to the administrative proceedings themselves?''
 He pointed out that he was asking that because clause 52 is said to apply to 
''administrative authorities in respect of administrative offences where a decision in the proceedings may be the subject of an appeal before a court''.
 Lord Carlisle went on to say: 
''That may be a definition of the term 'administrative proceedings', but proceedings themselves are taken before the administrative authority.'' 
He then quoted that a Home Office Minister had said in an earlier debate that administrative offences were 
''a category of offence that does not exist in the UK but does exist in some of our partner countries. In some EU countries, for example, offences such as driving offences are dealt with in that way.''
 The Minister is nodding. 
 Later on in the debate, it was said that Holland was an example of one of our EU partner countries where they treat driving offences as what they call administrative offences. Lord Carlisle wanted to know whether that means that one can make a request to this country if one wants to use it in an appeal—presumably against a conviction for a driving offence, which has been carried out by an administrative authority, in administrative proceedings—but one cannot respond to a request for evidence if one wants it for the purpose of bringing the case and conducting the case before the administrative authority in the first place. If it did mean that, Lord Carlisle wanted to know why, because he pointed out that that could be something of a nonsense. 
 The Attorney-General then made some interesting remarks. He said: 
''There has already been discussion in Committee about what 'administrative proceedings' in this context means.''
 It is important to bear in mind that this is the Attorney-General speaking for the Government: 
''They are not straightforward to identify and define because they do not have an exact counterpart in our own legal system. The example cited in the explanatory report to the Mutual Legal Assistance Convention is a German offence. That is an offence which, whilst not classified as a criminal offence, is punishable by a fine imposed by an administrative authority. It is known as ordnungswidrigkeit. However, there is a right of appeal to the ordinary criminal courts. It is intended to be an administrative proceeding where assistance might be sought.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. GC68–70.]
 Here we have the Attorney-General, on behalf of the Government, reinforcing in another place the complication of trying to approximate our law, which is based on the common law and Acts of Parliament over many centuries, with an entirely alien system of law, which in many countries is based on the Code 
 Napoléon, going back to Roman law. That is difficult to bring into harmony with UK law, which is why those on the Conservative Benches have such a problem with the whole concept of administrative proceedings. We would like this part of the Bill to be restricted to the criminal area because that is where we really need mutual legal assistance. We always want to use mutual legal assistance to crack down on crime, but it should not be extended to new kinds of administrative bodies that operate in other EU countries, which do not have similar procedures to ours. There would be great danger in trying to fit the two together. 
 Baroness Carnegy of Lour said that she wanted to make sure that she had understood the matter. She said: 
''According to Clause 52(1), the definition of 'clemency proceedings' is the removal—and or reduction—of penalties for offences which were not tried as criminal charges, but are matters such as driving licence offences in other countries which are tried in a different court. That does not apply to criminal charges. Is that correct?''
 After reading clause 52(1), that seemed to me to be a reasonable understanding of it. The Attorney-General, speaking on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, simply replied by saying: ''I think not.'' He was obviously not certain. He said: 
''They are two separate issues. The administrative proceedings are those which relate to an administrative offence, something which we might well regard as a criminal offence. It is tried as an administrative offence, but there is an appeal to a court and a penalty is imposed. Clemency proceedings are quite distinct. They are a form of procedure not known to us specifically, but which may well include what we might think of as an appeal for a reduction in a sentence''.
 Members will understand why I am so concerned about that. We are talking about the Attorney-General saying that he thinks something might not be right, and that we might think something is one thing when it is something else. That is a confused picture, and it would clarify matters for our courts if we took out the reference to clemency proceedings and administration proceedings and concentrated on the nub of what mutual legal assistance should be about: criminal law. That is what we want to achieve, and I hope that the Minister understands that serious points have been raised. 
 I shall finish by quoting one of the most senior and distinguished fellows in another place, Lord Renton, who has contributed to debates on these matters for something in the order of 40 or 50 years. He said: 
''Perhaps I may make a rather bold suggestion. We all have great respect for the Attorney-General's legal ability, but instead of committing himself to an answer on these confusing and difficult questions now, perhaps he would consider between now and Report the whole use of the expressions, 'administrative proceedings', 'criminal proceedings' and 'clemency'.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. 71.]
 From all of his experience, it seemed to Lord Renton that the Attorney-General was in a rather confused position. The provisions are complex. We are trying to take out some of the complexity, bring back clarity and restrict this part of the Bill to criminal proceedings, which is the nub of what we should concentrate on.

David Heath: I welcome you, Mr. Benton, to the Committee this morning. I am sure that we are all intensely grateful to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath for reading out almost the entire transcript of a Lords debate. I am not sure, however, that he quoted the best of the debates on the Bill from another place. There was much confusion, not from the Attorney-General, but from some of the noble Lords as to exactly what they were talking about.
 The fact is that legal systems vary between different countries in the European Union. We not only accept but applaud it. We do not believe in harmonisation of legal systems, and we do not want to have the same Code Napoléon as the basis of our legal system. We rejoice in English common law and Scots law, and have never attempted harmonisation between those two jurisdictions, let alone with our continental counterparts. That means that there will be different definitions for the proceedings that we are used to in England, those that Scotland is used to, and those that are considered the norm in continental Europe. Some criminal offences in this country have equivalents that are dealt with through administrative proceedings in other countries. Also, what other countries know as ''clemency proceedings'' are not known in English law in the same form; such cases are dealt with by the Court of Appeal in English law, in terms of administration, but they are not dealt with in the same way. 
 The basis for any mutual legal assistance treaty must be respect for, and accommodation of, each other's legal systems where possible. That is the basis on which the treaty was signed, and that is why administrative and clemency proceedings are expressly included. I do not have a problem with that. 
 However, I might have a problem if the mutual assistance arrangements were extended beyond Schengen countries to those with grossly different judicial systems that are not based on adherence to the European convention on human rights and the other norms of western Europe. I share that serious concern, if that is the issue that is meant to be addressed in the amendments. The Minister did not address that point when we discussed the issue earlier this week. On Second Reading, I gave the Minister the example of the United States of America, which has 51 jurisdictions with grossly different laws and proceedings. What is the norm for the commonwealth of Massachusetts is not the norm for the state of Mississippi. It would worry me intensely if we were to extend the proposals to American jurisdictions. There are other countries for which the effect would be even worse, because their systems are so alien. 
 On countries that are signed up to Schengen and the mutual legal aid convention, we have a problem not with the reliability of proceedings, but merely with the definition. We have to accept that mutuality is the key. There will be areas of English and Scots law that are unknown to German, Dutch or Spanish courts, but we expect their co-operation, because it is in our interests to expect it. It would be a mistake to take out substantial swathes of the legal systems of other 
 countries, simply because they are not expressed in precisely the same form in English or Scots law. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath is mistaken in his belief that that would be to our advantage, and I will not support his amendments.

Bob Ainsworth: The amendments relate to the assistance that the UK is obliged to provide, under Schengen and the mutual legal assistance convention, in cases of administrative and clemency proceedings, in certain circumstances. In some EU countries, such as Germany, Austria and Belgium, we are informed that certain traffic offences that would be criminal offences in this country are classified as administrative offences there. We must assist in proceedings brought by administrative authorities prosecuting such offences, provided that there may be a judicial phase to the proceedings—that is, that there is the possibility of an appeal to a court with criminal jurisdiction.
 Mutual legal assistance may be sought—and, under the mutual legal assistance convention, must be provided—at earlier stages of the proceedings, and not only at the later stage, when proceedings come before a criminal court. In another place, the Government introduced an amendment to clause 14, so that the clause would more accurately reflect, and would pick up more fully, our obligations, and enable us to assist in the earlier stages of such proceedings. 
 The term ''clemency proceedings'' is difficult to define. After lengthy consideration, we do not think there are UK domestic procedures that could correctly be described as such and we have not sought to legislate to enable the UK to request assistance in such cases. We are, however, informed by our European partners that some of them have proceedings that may, in some cases, be analogous to what we might describe as appeal applications, which they describe as clemency proceedings. Again, there may not be a true equivalent between the UK legal system and those of our European partners. 
 Clemency proceedings were relevant to the original Schengen countries—Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France—but the UK was a latecomer, so we had no influence on the drafting. Some of the terms are difficult to interpret, being based, as the hon. Gentleman says, on the civil law systems of the original member states. 
 Amendment No. 25 would mean that the UK could not provide assistance on administrative procedures or clemency proceedings, so we would be outside our treaty and international obligations. Amendment No. 27 would restrict assistance in clemency and administrative proceedings to cases in which proceedings have already been instituted. The use of the words 
''or intended to be carried on''
 is intended to equate to the investigation stage prior to the proceedings, in line with the stage at which we would assist in strictly criminal cases. For assistance to be granted, the requesting authority must pursue formal inquiries with a view to instigating proceedings at the same stage that assistance may be 
 requested when pursuing an investigation with a view to a criminal prosecution. 
 The hon. Gentleman said he desired to limit administrative proceedings, but Amendment No. 28 would widen their scope too much and would cover proceedings before a court, such as general civil proceedings, which are not covered by mutual legal assistance. 
 The hon. Gentleman's amendments would prevent us from fulfilling our international obligations on Schengen and the mutual legal assistance convention, so we cannot agree to them. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) has picked out a theme running through what the hon. Gentleman says, which is that there is almost a sense that unless other countries have exactly the same proceedings as us, which they call by the same names as we do and which have the same outcomes, we cannot co-operate and they must follow our legal system exactly. 
 I am also a little bit confused by the suggestion by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome that we should do that for European countries, but not for the United States. Of course, the United States has a different legal system from us, but surely he does not suggest that we cannot co-operate with it, offer it mutual legal assistance or expect it to offer us such assistance in return. Within the framework of the Bill, we should be co-operating to the full on normal mutual legal assistance and, when we get into intrusive procedures, we should apply a dual criminality test before we are prepared to do that. That is exactly what we want to do in the Bill. 
 I do not understand why the hon. Gentleman appears to apply one set of rules to the United States and another to the EU. We should be prepared to co-operate with everyone on ordinary mutual legal assistance. When procedures become intrusive, we should make certain checks—for example, on dual criminality requirements.

David Heath: I agree that we should co-operate in broad terms with the authorities in the United States, or those in any other country. There comes a point, however, where we have to ask whether the foundations of that law are based on the same principles as those in Europe. We are co-signatories of the European convention on human rights: some other countries are not. That is an obstacle in the provision of some areas of mutual assistance, including exchange of evidence for the purposes of—for instance—exercising the death penalty.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman is right: he used the word ''some.'' With regard to mutual legal assistance, we should, in general, be prepared to co-operate, whether or not the foundation of law is different. However, in some cases we should apply some kind of a test.

David Heath: Exactly.

Bob Ainsworth: So the hon. Gentleman and I agree.
 I ask the hon. Member for Surrey Heath to accept that we did make amendments in the House of Lords in response to issues that were raised. On this clause, the amendment that was made brings us into line with 
 our treaty obligations. His amendments would effectively oblige us to be in breach of them, so I cannot accept them.

Nick Hawkins: It has been useful that some things have been said on the record. I agree with the remarks of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome about celebrating our differences but, having celebrated the differences in our legal systems, I come to a conclusion that is different from his.
 It has been helpful that the Minister has confirmed that he agrees with me that these are complex and confusing matters—which is also what his colleague, the Attorney-General, said in another place, and I welcome the fact that the Minister accepted one of our amendments in another place on this clause. 
 I will not press this amendment to a Division, but I want to put on the record that we should not be in the situation that the Minister has just said that we are in. He effectively said, ''We—the British Government—have already signed up to this in a treaty, so Parliament must rubber stamp it.'' Committee members on these Benches are always very uncomfortable when we hear him say that, because it rather demeans the purpose for which we are all here. As I and many of my party colleagues have repeatedly said, the Government should get parliamentary authority before they sign up to all these things in treaties. If we did things that way around, we would have proper debate and Parliament would have its proper place. 
 Having said that, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 29, in
clause 14, page 9, line 8, at end insert— 
 '(aa) that if the conduct constituting the offence were to occur in a part of the United Kingdom, it would constitute an offence in that part, and'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 30, in
clause 14, page 9, line 13, leave out 
 'is to regard as conclusive a'
and insert 
 'may have regard to any'.

James Paice: Good morning, Mr. Benton. I stand up and everybody else leaves.

Barry Gardiner: Is that an invitation?

James Paice: Yes, I assure the hon. Gentleman that it is an invitation. If he wishes to leave, he is welcome to do so. If the Minister were to leave as well, I would not take umbrage—I would rapidly force through a number of amendments.
 The Minister said that this was a complex area, and these amendments demonstrate some of that complexity. I have broached what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said earlier: this issue was debated in another place, and I will not repeat it. However, some of the key points were not thoroughly explored. Debates in the other place are short and 
 succinct: that is a feature of them. Sometimes that is a strength, but at other times it means that issues are not properly covered. 
 These amendments address dual criminality. Amendment No. 29 would require that powers to arrange for evidence to be obtained should take place only if the offence that is being investigated would be an offence in that part of the United Kingdom as well as in the country that is making the request for evidence to be obtained. The Minister will undoubtedly point out to me that that is precisely what the 1990 Act states, and therefore that what we are proposing is an amendment to that Act. That is true. However, I made a mental note on an earlier comment: the Minister is already significantly changing that Act to reflect changes in constitutional arrangements, and so on. From here on, we can put behind us the issue of whether that Act should be changed. We could debate whether the Act has worked satisfactorily over 13 years in the context of dual criminality—perhaps the Minister can reassure us—but the key thing is that a request could be made to United Kingdom authorities to gather evidence in relation to an investigation or proceedings relating to an act that is not an offence in this country. That is a matter of some concern. Generally, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said, we share standards and approaches to law with the countries with which we signed up at the genesis of this legislation. However, there are variations; some things are offences in some countries and not in others. 
 There is great concern about the extension of this legislation beyond those countries. The way things are changing, I do not think that it is extreme to suggest that we might receive an application from a country that practises sharia law. Its legislation will be based on a completely different religious ethos from ours. We must, therefore, question whether this country should assist other countries' authorities in prosecuting in this country a person who is accused of something that we would not dream of considering to be a crime. That important point is highlighted by some contradictions in the legislation. Subsection (2) clearly omits reference to an offence being an offence in this country, but says that it should be an offence in the country in question, whereas subsection (4) relates to fiscal offences that must also be offences in this country. That contradiction is not easy to explain. 
 Clause 16 deals with the extension of statutory search powers. That is part and parcel of obtaining evidence, which is what this clause is about. It contains the caveat in subsection (1)(b) that it 
''would, if it occurred in England and Wales, constitute a serious arrestable offence.''
 In other words, there is a contradiction between the collecting offence—the statutory search powers that might be necessary—and the fiscal offences. 
 We face an issue of principle—should we help to prosecute or provide evidence that might lead to the prosecution of a person for something that is not an offence in this country?—and also the problem of what appear to be contradictions between clauses and even 
 parts of clauses. I hope that the Minister can address those matters. 
 I shall not quote at length from another place, but the Attorney-General said in reply to the debate: 
''To require a demonstration that the offence is an offence in this country would require an overseas authority investigating an offence under its own law to take on an unnecessary burden.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 23 January 2003; Vol. 643, c. GC76.]
 My first response to that is, ''so what?'' Our principal responsibility must be to protect our own citizens. I should have thought that the rights, privileges and freedoms that we take for granted in this country should take precedence. The Attorney-General's argument is completely undermined by the contradiction between the fiscal legislation and the terms of the statutory search powers in clause 16. I hope that the Minister will not again parade that as an argument, because it does not stand up to examination. 
 Amendment No. 30 reflects the same issue. Line 16 on page 9 states: 
''If it appears to the territorial authority that the request for assistance relates to a fiscal offence''.
 Elsewhere there is use of the phrase, ''regard as conclusive''. We have been celebrating the differences between legal systems, but the suggestion is that we should automatically regard as conclusive anything that comes forward. As far as administrative proceedings are concerned, the Secretary of State needs an element of discretion. The obligation to regard as conclusive is therefore not necessarily correct, and we propose to remove that and insert, 
''may have regard to any''
 information. That leaves the Secretary of State with an element of discretion over whether to proceed and provide the assistance that is sought. 
 The amendment relates to some of the arguments of the previous debate, but I shall not repeat those. It relates to the vagueness about what is an administrative proceeding. It is because that definition is vague, and because of the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath that things considered as administrative proceedings in some countries are not considered so in this country, that the Secretary of State should retain an element of discretion that is not apparent in the legislation as drafted.

David Heath: I congratulate the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice), who took the trouble to make the arguments afresh. My only criticism of the previous debate was that reading out large parts of the Lords debate is otiose. To make the arguments, however, is perfectly proper.
 The issue of dual criminality is important. The Minister needs to say whether criminality becomes an issue at the point of an intrusive procedure or at the point when the original request is received. The argument of the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire is that that should be included in this clause, and that criminality should come into effect at the point at which the request is received. I 
 suspect that the Government will say that that is not the right point, and that criminality should come into effect when investigations of an intrusive nature are instigated in this country. 
 That debate is arguable in either direction, but accepting the argument for inclusion at an earlier stage would obviate the need to have it later. That, however, could prevent basic information from being passed on in co-operation with an overseas authority, such as information on police records about the identity or existence of a person in a country. It might be possible for such information properly to be passed to an overseas authority without the instigation of intrusive procedures for collection of evidence. I can see that there are arguments either way, and I look forward to the Minister's reply. The provisions will not have as serious a consequence as the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire thinks because safeguards exist in later clauses. He was good enough to accept that point. 
 I have a problem with amendment No. 30, which is not based simply on the fact that I think we should respect each other's authorities, and that a basic level of trust is appropriate. I am not sure whether an authority in this country would be in a position to challenge the institution of proceedings in another country, or challenge whether there was reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed in that country. I should have thought that only the legal authorities in that country were in a position to say that, so the certificate must be accepted at face value unless it is manifestly absurd. I have a degree of confidence that judicial authorities in other countries would not put forward a certificate that was so absurd. 
 We must always consider the reciprocal arrangements. For example, would we expect a Belgian authority not to accept the fact that the Cambridgeshire constabulary had started investigative or legal proceedings against a person and that those proceedings were based on an offence in the United Kingdom? We would not expect that to be challenged by an authority in another country, when making a request for mutual assistance. Although I understand the hon. Gentleman's point, I am not sure that there are circumstances in which such a challenge would be sustainable or open to sensible investigation, other than in an extreme situation when a certificate was manifestly absurd. I note that he is about to give me an example.

James Paice: I am not about to give the hon. Gentleman such an example, but I thank him for giving way. The provision states that the certificate that is to be regarded as conclusive is
''a certificate as to the matters mentioned in subsection (2)'',
 which states 
''that an offence under the law of the country in question has been committed or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that such an offence has been committed'',
 or that an investigation is being carried out. There is nothing in the provision that necessarily relates such matters to evidence that may exist in this country. Before we expend resources on searching for evidence or arranging for evidence to be obtained, it is right that 
 the territorial authority in this country should have information on whether there is evidence in this country to support it. Such action does not constitute an argument about whether an offence has been committed in another country. We would take that as an honest statement. The matter is critical, given that British resources will be used. I am worried about whether there will be an implication for this country.

David Heath: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I understand his point but, with great respect, if that were his intention, the amendment is aimed in the wrong direction. He should be adding a requirement to subsection (2) that needs to be satisfied. At present, the only things that remain to be satisfied are the two points under subsection (2), the first of which is that an offence has been committed or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed and, secondly, that legal or investigative proceedings have been undertaken. Both issues are conclusive. They are not open to sensible challenge from the authorities in this country.
 The hon. Gentleman is asking for a third condition, which is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is evidence that is pertinent to those conditions in this country. Had he tabled an amendment to that effect, it would have given rise to a more considered debate.

James Paice: I take the hon. Gentleman's point. There is another way in which to go about matters. I want to introduce an element of discretion. The certificate may be conclusive in respect of subsection (2)(a) and (b), but it should not be conclusive that the authority should commit British resources. Saying that it should be regarded as conclusive, but that it may have regard to a certificate reassures us about part 2, and leaves open the discretion that there should be some sign of the matter being relevant to this country. The hon. Gentleman's alternative suggestion may be a different way in which to proceed, but I strongly contend that my proposed amendment also opens up that element of discretion, which is all that I am trying to achieve.

David Heath: I am grateful, but I still have to argue with the hon. Gentleman about the adequacy of his amendment. Discretion is covered under clause 14(1), which states:
''The territorial authority may arrange for evidence''.
 That deals with his point. He is trying to allow for the question of the certificate under subsection (2). That is an open and shut case. Obviously, I have not persuaded the hon. Gentleman of the logic of my argument. However, I have entirely satisfied myself.

Bob Ainsworth: It is good to know that the hon. Gentleman is satisfied. Amendment No. 29 would require dual criminality in respect of any requests for evidence. There is currently no requirement for that in respect of requests for evidence to be taken before a court. To introduce it would be a backward step. It is contrary to international agreements, including the 1959 Council of Europe convention on mutual legal assistance, which the United Kingdom ratified in 1991.
 We would not want other countries to make a dual criminality requirement in respect of all requests from the United Kingdom. That would hinder an effective investigation of crime. The hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire says that we should not tell him that such measures were in the 1990 Act, but explain how the 1990 Act has operated. We do not keep records that show how frequently we assist in matters that are not considered to be offences in this country. 
 There is no requirement to establish whether there is dual criminality, so it would be a poor use of resources to require case workers to assess that in every case. I cannot therefore inform the hon. Gentleman of how many times or in what ways we have given assistance when the dual criminality measure would not apply. I am sorry that I am not able to do that, because records have not been kept. 
 Amendment No. 30 would introduce discretion where none currently exists. It would require the territorial authority to establish the validity of the basis of a certificate independently of the confirmation provided by the requesting authority. We consider that the subsection is correctly drafted. It replicates the existing provision and provides that a certificate from an overseas authority is to be regarded as conclusive about the matters covered by the request. In all but exceptional cases, the certificate is not required. 
 The letter of request will contain sufficient information for the territorial authority to be satisfied over the measures in subsections (1) and (2). It is not a requirement for us to go behind the request and independently establish the facts of the case. As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said, we would not necessarily expect in such cases that an overseas authority would go behind a request that we made to find out whether a police force were carrying out such an investigation or whether a matter appeared before a court. 
 A certificate is useful in particularly complex cases as it sets out exactly which matters are being investigated when that is not clear from the request. In such cases, the territorial authority may ask the requesting state to send a certificate setting out further information to support the original request. Under the 1990 Act, there have been infrequent occasions when the central authority has insisted on a certificate, but the provision has been used to good effect in those cases where it has not been clear what the purpose of the request was from the original letter or subsequent inquiries that have attempted to clarify the position. 
 As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome says, it comes down to when we impose the dual criminality requirement. In past years, we have imposed it only when coercive investigative procedures or searches have been involved. I do not believe that problems have arisen from that, but I cannot give the hon. Gentleman chapter and verse on the subject. We plan to replicate the provisions of the old legislation in the Bill, and we will not do what the hon. Gentleman asks us to do—impose a dual criminality requirement in areas where we have not previously done so, and where we do not perceive there to be a problem.

James Paice: Well, the seventh cavalry has left, and the sixth-and-a-half, in the form of the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, has come to the Government's rescue. It seems today that the Lib-Lab pact is riding high again, and is trying to knock down the amendments that my hon. Friends and I have tabled. We should table several more amendments. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome tempts me, I shall table considerably more.
 The issue of dual criminality is clearly a matter of judgment and opinion. I understand the Minister's arguments on why the provision should not come in, but I remain of the view that it should. However, he is clearly adamant on the subject. I was interested to hear that he does not actually know what the impact has been—he explained why—or whether the issue has arisen in the 13 years since the 1990 legislation was passed. I was really trying to extract that information. 
 On amendment No. 30, it came out in the Minister's reply that what I am seeking is actually taking place; there are occasions on which the authority will ask for further information. I think that that is what the Minister said. He said that there are occasions when the authority may go back to the country that is asking for assistance.

Bob Ainsworth: In my understanding, not after the certificate; the certificate is effectively what brings the matter to a close. An original request is made. Sometimes, clarification of the request is sought, and sometimes—although rarely—there are difficulties getting that. The certificate is the last method used to impose clarity on what exactly is being asked for.

James Paice: That is a helpful intervention. Clearly, I slightly misunderstood the Minister's earlier comment. None the less, what the Minister says means that it is not simply the receipt of a certificate that takes place, but an exchange of information before that. In practice, what I am seeking to achieve is that some evidence apart from what appears baldly in Bill, which is the simple fact that
''an offence . . . has been committed or that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that such an offence has been committed, and . . . that proceedings . . . have been instituted'',
 all of which could be put into two lines of a document. The Minister is telling us that there is more to the matter than that. I am puzzled as to why that is not made clearer in the Bill. The point is that, from what the Minister has said, what I am seeking to achieve, which is that authorities should be given more information than the bald facts outlined in subsection (2), is already provided for, so it is pointless to pursue that amendment. 
 That brings me back to the issue of dual criminality, which remains a matter of debate and judgment, and on that basis we had better leave the amendment this time. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15 - Nominating a court etc. to receive evidence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I have a brief point to raise. The clause was not debated at all in the other place, because there were a couple of amendments that Baroness Carnegy of Lour did not move, for reasons that she explained. In effect, the clause went through the other place on the nod. We on the Conservative Benches do not have a problem with the clause; in fact, we strongly approve of subsection (2), which is about the Secretary of State referring matters that relate to serious or complex fraud to the director of the Serious Fraud Office.
 I hope the Minister will be able to answer just one question. If he cannot answer it today, I hope that he will, with his usual courtesy, do me the honour of writing to me to explain things. Subsection (1) says: 
''Where the evidence is in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State may by a notice nominate a court to receive any evidence to which the request relates which appears to the court to be appropriate for the purpose of giving effect to the request.''
 What form will that notice take? If that has, as I anticipate, been going on since the 1990 Act, perhaps the Minister could show me an example of the notices that are used. If he cannot answer now, perhaps he will write to me and other Committee members.

Bob Ainsworth: If there is a standard notice, I shall provide all Committee members with a copy.

Lady Hermon: I am delighted to see you in the Chair, Mr. Benton.
 Will the Minister clarify yet again his point on the Assets Recovery Agency? It does useful work tackling serious fraud and basic criminality, committed principally by loyalist and republican paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, but has extensive powers throughout the UK. Will the Minister consider whether under the clause a request for evidence would impinge on the good work that the agency is doing?

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Lady suggests a request for evidence from an overseas authority. It is difficult for me to respond off the top of my head. I do not see how, by the mere fact of having established an agency to try to seize and confiscate criminal assets, we can or should refuse to give mutual legal assistance on requests from abroad. I am not certain that one will cut across the other. I am happy to explore that outside with the hon. Lady, to try to satisfy her that that is not the case. I know that she is concerned that the Assets Recovery Agency should be as effective as possible, especially in Northern Ireland. I am reaching for her concerns, but I do not understand how those arise as a result of our giving mutual legal assistance and cutting across the Assets Recovery Agency.

Lady Hermon: The Minister will appreciate that it tracks devious individuals who are well organised through their paramilitary links and connections that they have built up over many years. I am concerned that if a request came from a court, tribunal or body in
 the Republic of Ireland, which shares a land frontier with Northern Ireland, it could jeopardise ongoing investigations carried out by the Assets Recovery Agency.

Bob Ainsworth: There is no requirement on us to give assistance if ongoing procedures in this country could be jeopardised by giving evidence or assistance offered abroad. We would have to be certain about that. A problem could potentially arise, because people would need to be aware of all the investigations that are taking place, including those carried out by the Assets Recovery Agency. I can see the hon. Lady's point. I shall consider that further and contact her outside the Committee.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 15 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 1 agreed to.

Clause 16 - Extension of statutory search powers in

James Paice: I beg to move amendment No. 34, in
clause 16, page 10, line 16, after first 'investigation', insert 
 'of which he has personal knowledge'.

Joe Benton: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 35, in 
clause 19, page 11, line 33, at end insert 
 'within such time as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe'.
 Amendment No. 36, in 
clause 19, page 11, line 33, at end insert— 
 '(1A) A constable who has seized evidence under or by virtue of sections 16, 17 or 18, shall make and retain a copy (or, where appropriate, a photograph or other representation) of that evidence in accordance with regulations which shall be made by the Secretary of State by order.'.
 Amendment No. 133, in 
clause 19, page 11, line 32, after 'sent', insert 
 'after a period of seven days'.

James Paice: The Conservatives have three disparate amendments in this group, which includes one tabled by the Liberal Democrats. In amendment No. 34, I return to a point that I raised in a previous sitting. There appears to be a discrepancy between the Bill and the explanatory notes in relation to obtaining the warrant for statutory search powers and whether the officer who seeks such a warrant knows what he or she is talking about.
 As drafted, the Bill refers to the person making the application as a member of the international joint investigation team. Simply being a member of a team does not necessarily mean that every member is fully up to speed with the details of the case, and paragraph 61 on page 11 of the explanatory notes states: 
''The constable making the application for the warrant or order would have personal knowledge of the joint investigation as he would in making such an application in a domestic investigation.''
 Although it may seem pedantic, the amendment would put in the Bill precisely what the explanatory notes 
 lead us to expect would be the case: that anyone making an application for a warrant knows what they are talking about and has personal knowledge of the case rather than simply being part of a team, which could be a loose association. It may be difficult to define precisely who is a member of a team. 
 I am delighted to point out to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome that the issue raised in amendment No. 35 was not debated in the other place, nor was the issue raised in amendment No. 36, before the hon. Gentleman rushes to assert his reason for tabling his amendment. 
 Clause 19, which refers to seized evidence, presumably the result of search powers, should include a time frame in which to comply with the request for assistance. Amendment No. 35 proposes that the time scale be laid down by the Secretary of State, and the hon. Gentleman's amendment proposes a period of seven days. It is a matter for debate; an element of discretion would be appropriate because seven days may not be enough time in some cases. The Secretary of State should have discretion, but he and the authorities need some discipline to deal with the matter within a reasonable period. Requiring the Secretary of State to lay down a time frame would make things clear and clarify the issue for the overseas authorities who seek information from this country. They would know the time they had to operate, how long they had to wait and when they could proceed to the next part of their proceedings. 
 Amendment No. 36 is important. It would require a replica or copy of the evidence obtained in this country to be made before it is passed to an authority from another country. The Minister will challenge me by asking why we need a copy in this country—the answer might be that I do not know—and I will tell him that it is because it is not possible to foresee the circumstances in which that information could be useful. We do not know whether subsequent investigations may hinge on that evidence. This country could commence a criminal investigation on the back of what has taken place in a court in another country. That happens, and the evidence may become useful at a later stage. It is important therefore that a copy, replica or representation should be made so that our authorities have a record of the evidence that has been handed over.

Lady Hermon: The hon. Gentleman has raised an important point. One example of its significance would be if evidence were requested by the Republic of Ireland in the ongoing investigations into the Omagh bombing, because there are persons who have not faced trial in the Republic but whom we believe to be connected with the bombing. If evidence left Northern Ireland under this legislation—properly, as I welcome co-operation between member states—I would hope that in pursuing those within Northern Ireland who are responsible and have never been brought to justice for the deaths of 31 people in Omagh, we would be able to avail ourselves of the evidence that had been sent to the Republic of Ireland.

James Paice: The hon. Lady has filled a gap in my knowledge and argument, and I am grateful to her. She gave a good example and clear answer to the question that I suggested that the Minister might ask.
 Another point, on which the hon. Lady's intervention allowed me to refresh my mind, is about protecting our officers from accusations that they have tampered with evidence. The police have raised their concern about protecting British officers from misplaced accusations, which is relevant for several parts of the Bill, especially clause 82. If a copy, replica or representation of evidence is taken, it could help prevent or respond to accusations that the police in this country have tampered with evidence, collected incorrect evidence or failed to send it all. Although the three amendments are in some ways disparate, they are all important. However, amendment No. 36, which is about keeping a copy, is the most important.

David Heath: I thank the hon. Gentleman for tabling the interesting and novel amendments. They explore important areas, and I have some sympathy with each of the three. I shall speak briefly to those amendments before covering my own.
 The hon. Gentleman is right that amendment No. 34 could be held to be pedantic. I have not had a chance to look at the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, so I have not checked whether a similar requirement is written in law for domestic search warrants. He drew the analogy of practice in an English court, and it is a question that would not normally be asked by a magistrate or circuit judge who agreed to a search warrant. Irrespective of whether it is written into statute, it raises an important point and I hope that the Minister will respond appropriately. 
 The hon. Gentleman's point about keeping a record of evidence is serious, and I agree that amendment No. 36 is the most important of his group. One can envisage circumstances in which evidence requested and removed from the United Kingdom on this basis might have evidential value in future proceedings in the UK or in disciplinary hearings against officers who were accused of improperly discharging their duties. It would be entirely appropriate to have some sort of record, and I hope that the Minister will seriously consider the point. If he cannot accept the amendment, I hope that he will at least take advice on the value of the proposed procedure. 
 On the time frame, amendment No. 133, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland, and amendment No. 35 work in opposite directions. The time frame in one would mean that evidence could not be passed on before a certain time, while the time frame in the other would limit the length of time that the overseas authority could reasonably expect to wait before evidence was transmitted. Both amendments have their value. 
 My amendment was suggested by the Law Society and is intended to deal with one of its concerns, which I hope that the Minister will address. The society does not want to frustrate the principle or the reality of mutual recognition, or to impede the passing on of evidence. However, it is concerned about the position of legally privileged material, as set out in the Criminal 
 Justice and Police Act 2001 and in code B of the 1984 Act. The protections in those Acts reappear in clause 26, but if evidence is passed on before a reasonable time—it need only be a short time—there will be no opportunity to make an application in respect of legally privileged material. In other words, the safeguards will be rendered useless by the fact that the evidence has already been passed on. One could complain as much as one liked to the court that it was legally privileged, but that would have no effect once it had passed to another jurisdiction. The Law Society therefore suggests that there should be at least a short period to allow that process to take place and the safeguards to become a reality. 
 I think that the Minister understands the point, and it is not unreasonable. I leave it to him to decide whether seven days is an appropriate length of time. The purport of the comments by the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire was that there should be an upper limit, although I do not know what would constitute a reasonable period—one could almost pluck a figure out of the air. However, it would be reasonable at least to give authorities guidance as to what would constitute a reasonable upper limit. 
 This is an interesting group of amendments, all of which have a purpose and all of which would make a significant difference to the operation of the Bill. The Minister would do well to take careful note of them.

Bob Ainsworth: The purpose of the amendments is to impose greater safeguards on the acquisition and communication of evidence obtained in response to an overseas request. However, the Bill already provides sufficient safeguards.
 Amendment No. 34 relates to subsection (2)(b) and to international joint investigation teams. Article 13 of the mutual legal assistance convention provides a framework for establishing such teams. Their purpose is to carry out joint investigations into crimes with cross-border elements, with a view to improving and speeding up the investigation of such crimes. Teams will be set up by two or more member states for a specific purpose and for specific investigations, which may be carried in any of the participating member states. All team members must act under the direction of the team leader, who must be provided by the competent authorities of the member state where the team carries out its investigation. If the investigation moves into another member state's territory, the team leader will change. Teams based in the UK and led by a senior UK customs officer, for instance, would be answerable, through him, to Her Majesty's Customs and Excise. Teams led by a senior UK police officer, while in the UK, would be answerable to their own chief of police.

Nick Hawkins: When I read in the response from the Attorney-General in another place what the Minister has just read out about the fact that, when a cross-border investigation is taking place, the team leader will change as soon the investigation moves to another state, I was slightly puzzled. It seemed to me that it would be more sensible, as long as officers from the state that it had just moved into were still involved, if
 the team leader remained the same throughout. Otherwise, the situation is a recipe for confusion. Will the Minister reflect on that? I realise that he cannot change the practice now, but will he at least talk to his officials about whether it might be talked about with our European partners? Knowing a little about investigations, I submit that the system would surely work better if the team leader stayed the same throughout.

Bob Ainsworth: I am not sure that I agree with the hon. Gentleman. The point that I am making on the amendment is that the team will not be loosely defined, as the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire suggested. The members have to be seconded to the team, and there has to be an agreement to set up the team. The composition of the team is as set out in the original agreement. I am not sure that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath would want that for which he asks. Is he seriously suggesting that a joint investigation team should carry on its operations in this country with a Dutchman or German in charge? I would probably be much more comfortable with that than the hon. Gentleman would be, but that is the purport of what he says. It is not what the convention says, and I am not certain that it would be acceptable.
 When an operation took place in our country, we would require that the person leading the team was a senior police officer or a customs officer, and of course they would need other members in order to be able to co-operate with foreign jurisdictions, establish lines of communication and cut out the bureaucracy that would otherwise be imposed. I shall reflect on what the hon. Gentleman says, but I hope that he will, too, because he would have many more concerns about what he asks for than I would.

Lady Hermon: I am grateful to the Minister for taking yet another intervention. I have mentioned this point to him privately, and it concerns me greatly. In the operation of a joint investigation team, with the best will in the world, sometimes things go wrong. Could the Minister confirm that if something goes wrong in Northern Ireland, the complaint will go to the police ombudsman—who does a terrific job against a lot of opposition and who takes a lot of unjust criticism—and that if something goes wrong elsewhere in the United Kingdom, the complaint will go to the Police Complaints Commission?

Bob Ainsworth: The accountability that the hon. Lady talks about is the reason why the joint team needs to be led by a person covered by the jurisdiction in which it operates. Only if it is led by a British police officer operating in the UK can that team be accountable through that senior person, who is in charge of the team and leading the team for that duration. If it is led by a foreign police officer or foreign customs officer, the lines of accountability would become blurred and difficult.

Lady Hermon: I have to press the Minister a little further, because I was bitterly disappointed by the written reply of 19 May from the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office. I asked whether any consultations had taken place with the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland. Her reply was:
''No consultations have taken place with the Police Ombudsman in relation to the Crime (International Co-operation) Bill.''—[Official Report, 19 May 2003; Vol. 405, c. 591W.]
 That was a very disappointing response. I expected there to be consultation. 
 There might be a joint investigation team with officers from the Garda Siochana. Sensitivities are involved, which must be recognised by the UK Government. If there is a joint investigation team, the ombudsman—or the Police Complaints Authority, elsewhere in the UK—must have jurisdiction to investigate complaints against such officers. That is important.

Bob Ainsworth: I understand that point. When we were drawing up the legislation, we consulted the Northern Ireland Office. It has been involved, and it is happy with the current drafting, but it is difficult for the Home Office to become involved in matters such as the people it chose and how it came to that conclusion. Those are matters for Northern Ireland, but the hon. Lady is seeking to draw me into them. I do not know what consultations took place or whom the Northern Ireland Office chose to consult on the framing of the legislation before it returned to us.

Lady Hermon: I am grateful to the Minister for giving way again: I promise not to interrupt him for at least another five minutes.
 I wish to put it on the record that I have no criticism to make of the Home Office. It has worked hard with representatives from my party—on the Criminal Justice Bill, for example—and the Minister has tried to co-operate with my colleagues and I. The difficulty is with the Northern Ireland Office.

Bob Ainsworth: I fear that the hon. Lady is drawing me into something that she is more familiar with than I am, and that this is an axe that she has chosen to grind—I do not use that phrase in a derogatory way—for some time. I do not understand every aspect of the matter, so I hope that she will forgive me if I do not seek to go into it any further.

David Heath: I shall move the Minister away from Northern Ireland, which may come as a relief to him.
 As we are considering amendments to clause 19 and the position of the international joint investigation teams, I hope that it will not be out of order for me to ask this: how will the evidence that is obtained under a warrant by a member of a joint investigation team get to the traditional authorities in the country in question, given that clause 19(3) appears to delete references to the international joint investigation team from the arrangements for transmitting evidence to the judicial authorities?

Joe Benton: Order. As we are not yet debating clause 19, it might be more appropriate if that question were debated when we do so.

David Heath: Thank you, Mr. Benton. I am happy to raise it then.

Bob Ainsworth: I will comply with that. However, if the hon. Gentleman reflects on this matter, perhaps he will recognise that a request from a joint investigation team should go back to the joint investigation team. It is for that team to continue its investigation: it is not
 obliged to transmit such things to a requesting authority, as it is effectively the requesting authority itself. We can discuss that when we deal with clause 19.
 I shall continue dealing with the amendments that we are discussing. On amendment No. 34, subsection (2)(b) enables constables acting as members of international joint investigation teams to apply for search warrants or production orders under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. That implements article 13(7) of the mutual legal assistance convention, which provides that members of a team should be able to request their own authorities to take such measures as they would be able to request in a domestic investigation. A UK member of a team who is a police officer would be able to apply for a search warrant or a production order for evidence in the UK in relation to an overseas investigation, without a formal request from abroad. Such a request would not be necessary—to go on to the point that the hon. Gentleman was just making—as the police officer would be able to apply for such a warrant or production order on the basis of his own knowledge of the investigation. The usual domestic safeguards set out in PACE would apply to such applications. 
 Amendment No. 34 seeks to ensure that the constable has personal knowledge of the investigation in question. That is unnecessary, because the constable applying for a search warrant or production order in these circumstances must be a member of the joint investigation team, and the warrant on the order must be sought for the purposes of that investigation. Officers in joint investigation teams will clearly have personal knowledge of the joint investigation, just as they would if seeking a search warrant as part of a domestic investigation. 
 Amendment No. 35 would impose a time limit for the transmission of seized evidence to the requesting authority, which is to be set by the Secretary of State in an order. Amendment No. 133 would delay the transmission of evidence with the effect that evidence must be held for seven days before it can be transmitted. Both amendments present problems. The imposition of a deadline would be restrictive. The UK is under no obligation to return evidence within a specific period and current legislation does not set time limits. It is a matter of good practice that evidence will generally be returned as soon as possible. Transmission will usually be immediate, but that does not mean that a specified time limit would be of benefit. 
 There may sometimes be good reason not to return evidence immediately. For example, a request might involve multiple searches, in which case it may be practical to wait until all the evidence has been obtained and consolidated rather than sending a stream of different items back separately. Alternatively, there might be an application for a judicial review, which needs to be resolved before the evidence is transmitted. Other cases will be straightforward and involve a single production order, and it should be possible to send the evidence 
 back straight away. In such cases, retaining the evidence would cause unnecessary delays. 
 Amendment No. 36 would impose a mandatory requirement to keep a copy of all evidence obtained in response to a mutual legal assistance request. I can tell the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) that the police are free to make such a copy if they want to and believe that it will assist them, or they need to because they want the safeguards that the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire mentioned. If a particular investigation was subsequently started in this country, we would be able to request evidence required for our own investigation to be returned under the same jurisdiction that we provided the evidence in the first place. To move from that to a requirement in statute to keep a copy of every item of evidence required is quite different. 
 The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome asked whether there was a problem with legally privileged material, whether an application could be made and whether there was a potential problem with the immediate transmission. I shall reflect on whether there is a real problem and return to him later. I understand his point, and we would not want to delay straightforward pieces of legislation; I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would not want us to sit on information for seven days without good reason. However, there might be practical problems if people wanted to make a challenge, and we had denied them that opportunity. I shall check the procedures to see whether I can satisfy the hon. Gentleman.

Stephen Hesford: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Bob Ainsworth: My hon. Friend may be able to help me.

Stephen Hesford: It is possible—anything is possible.
 I am listening to the Minister with interest. If we help a foreign jurisdiction collect evidence, and we send the evidence to that jurisdiction under these procedures, is there any duty on it to look after the evidence and treat it properly? My hon. Friend has just made the reasonable point that if we started an investigation, we could request the evidence back. However, if the evidence has been destroyed, lost or mishandled, we will not be able to get it back. Is there at least an expectation or duty to look after the evidence?

Bob Ainsworth: I do not believe that any duty is imposed by the treaties, but there are, obviously, procedures and requirements within each jurisdiction for maintaining and keeping records, and for looking after evidence that is being used in a court case. They might differ from ours; they might not be as extensive as ours and we might not be able to help with subsequent requests for return of evidence that has been supplied to us. I accept my hon. Friend's point, but the only way round that would be for us to keep copies of every single thing that we send in every case and to be prepared to retain them for long enough to cover all eventualities.

David Heath: First, I thank the Minister for agreeing to consider my earlier point. I am not trying to be a barrack-room lawyer or to pose difficulties, but I wonder whether police really have the power to make copies and to retain material that they have seized under warrant for the specific purposes of an offence under another jurisdiction, which does not relate to investigation of an offence under British jurisdiction and is not clearly of value in investigative or judicial procedures. Might they not fall foul of data protection legislation in such circumstances? I do not know the answer, and I am not trying to be clever, I just wonder whether that is an issue.

Bob Ainsworth: The hon. Gentleman might not be trying to be clever, but he seems to want to have his cake and eat it. Let us keep everything by statute—

David Heath: By statute, that is the point.

Bob Ainsworth: Absolutely. I am told that the police can keep information gathered in response to a request from a foreign jurisdiction if they believe that it is appropriate to do so. If the situation is different, I shall clarify it.

James Paice: I am grateful to hon. Members who have participated in the debate and to the Minister for his reply. The issue of making and retaining copies or replicas seems, by common consent, to be the most significant. I understand what the Minister says, but I am not convinced about the ability to do so, if it exists, and I share the doubts of some hon. Members about whether there are constraints in the way of the police. I seem to recall that the copying of some evidence is not permitted, but I might be wrong. It is a big issue.
 The Minister seems to be saying that if I had used the word ''may'' instead of ''shall'' make and retain a copy, he would have said that it is not necessary because they already can. He seems to be taking issue with the obligation represented by the word ''shall''. I recognise that that might be seen as sometimes onerous. However, as I said in my opening remarks, one cannot always predict events. It is all very well saying to the police that they can if they want to, but they might not know what is coming either. As the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford) said earlier, one cannot be certain that one will get the material back, whatever the intention might be. I hope that the Minister will revisit the issue. It is important, and we shall want to return to it. 
 Of the earlier amendments, amendment No. 35 concerns the time scale. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome read into it that I was working in an opposite direction to his. I was merely leaving the Secretary of State with the flexibility to set minima and maxima. I am reluctant to admit it, but I am probably persuaded by the Minister's argument that there are so many variables that the object would be difficult to achieve, so we shall pass on that. 
 On the question whether the officer has personal knowledge, I do not see why that should not be in the Bill if it is current practice and if it is described in the explanatory notes. Nevertheless, I recognise the Minister's argument, especially when he referred to 
 the team being a discrete team, not a loose association. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 17 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 18 - Warrants in Scotland

Amendment made: No. 87, in 
clause 18, page 11, line 20, after 'constable', insert 'or customs officer'.—[Mr. Ainsworth.]
 Clause 18, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 - Seized evidence

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I know that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome has already said that he wants to raise a point about the clause, but I want to ask the Minister a one-sentence question. The clause states:
''where the evidence consists of a document, the original or a copy is to be sent''.
 The Minister will recall that some very important terrorist cases in the Irish Republic collapsed because the prosecuting authorities in this country did not manage to send the right documents: they sent copies when they should have sent originals. I am not making a politically partisan point, because that has happened under Governments of both parties. 
 Will the Minister reassure the Committee for the record that we will not have any problems with other countries, especially the Irish Republic, by inserting into our law a clause that states that where the evidence consists of a document, the original or a copy is to be sent? I hope that the Minister understands the serious point that I am trying to make. I am trying to be helpful, and I want to ensure that the Minister and his officials can reconsider the subsection if they need to ascertain whether they need to insert a subsection that says, in effect, ''But we know that we always need to send an original if the other court requires it'', or something along those lines.

David Heath: I want to pursue an issue that I attempted to raise earlier. I am trying to ensure that subsection (3) does not introduce any difficulty. An international joint investigation team may investigate offences in this country or under another jurisdiction. There is no problem if, for the purposes of its investigation, the team seeks a search warrant and seizes material that is to be used in proceedings in this country. If it seizes material to be used under another jurisdiction, would the court in that jurisdiction have to make a new request to enable the material collected by the joint investigation team to be transmitted to that court? In what circumstances could the team use evidence in an investigation into a matter that was already the subject of proceedings under another jurisdiction? Will the disclaimer in subsection (3) prove to be an obstacle to using what common sense
 dictates: that once a team has a search warrant, and goes in and finds the evidence, it should be able to use it in the proceedings for which it was gathered? I do not know the answer, but the subsection appears to introduce an unnecessary obstacle. I do, of course, understand that the joint investigation team would be the requesting authority in an investigation alone. I am simply trying to ensure that the evidence is available for proceedings subsequent to that investigation.

Bob Ainsworth: I shall deal first with the point made by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. The hon. Gentleman is right that there have been problems. Mutual legal assistance between two countries will never be a foolproof procedure. Domestic law differs. The key is the framing of the request and ensuring that the requested material will be in a form that the jurisdiction seeking to bring the case before the court can use. The hon. Gentleman is right that problems could arise if the request for information is not framed in that form. That is why we are obliged to respond to requests in a particular way. The only get-out is if there is some fundamental legal reason why it is not possible to respond to those requests. The hon. Gentleman raises an issue that will always be a potential difficulty if people do not frame requests correctly.
 I gave the hon. Gentleman an answer in response to his question about joint investigation teams, but he now chases the argument one stage further back. The reason for the subsection is that the joint investigation team would have been originator of the request, which he accepts. The team would have been set up to undertake a specific operation with a view to bringing a prosecution. I do not want to respond off the top of my head to the question about the flexibility given to the joint investigation team at that stage to pass on information that comes its way that might be peripheral to the original reason for its establishment. The hon. Gentleman makes a good point in trying to check whether we are imposing inappropriate restrictions on passing on information that may come to hand. I shall try to ascertain what the procedures are for going wider than the original intent of the joint investigation team in passing on the information. There may be restrictions that are appropriate.

David Heath: I am grateful to the Minister for considering the issue. His response addresses part of it, but the core intent of the investigation also bothers me. The member of the investigating team can secure evidence for the purposes of investigating the specific crime to which it relates. As I read it, however, there must be a second request to pass that evidence to a court under another jurisdiction so that proceedings can take place. What bothers me is the introduction of a two-stage process where a one-stage process would suffice. I may be misreading the clause, but that is how I interpret it.

Bob Ainsworth: I am fairly sure that that is not the case. The point of the joint investigation team was to gather evidence, to bring a prosecution and to present it to an appropriate court. The core reason is probably
 covered, but I shall check. Issues that arise and information that the team comes across during its investigation is another point.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 19 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 20 - Overseas freezing orders

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 134, in
clause 20, page 12, line 16, after 'other', insert 'judicial'.
 The amendment would introduce ''judicial'' into line 16 of the clause so that it would read, ''any other judicial authority in the country.'' That would act as a safeguard against the extension of the quite significant powers given to administrative authorities that are outside the judicial process. We have already debated the difficulty of translating terms used in other jurisdictions into British law, and I understand why some of the proposals set out in the debate in another place were not acceptable to the Government, because they defined matters in terms of a court exercising criminal jurisdiction. We still have the problem of whether the administrative courts have a criminal jurisdiction. I hope that by inserting ''judicial'' we make it clear that we are talking not about purely administrative authorities in other countries having such a right, and that it must be via a judicial process. That is to say, it must be subject to judicial approval at some point within that country, but it also means that it is open to appeal mechanisms and so on, which are the necessary safeguards to ensure a fair process. 
 There may still be authorities that will fall outside the judicial category, but I cannot think of authorities to which we would want to extend the arrangement that would not be defined as judicial. It seems a sensible precaution to have in the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: Despite the fact that the hon. Gentleman has been quite critical of my comments on earlier groups of amendments and some of the things that my hon. Friend the Member for South-East Cambridgeshire said, it is a genuine pleasure to rise to support him. There are occasions on which we agree, and it is not a Lib-Lab pact flying high. On this occasion, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats are both trying to introduce some sensible safeguards. I strongly support the hon. Gentleman's remarks on amendment No. 134. We feel that the Bill would be clearer if the word ''judicial'' were introduced.

Lady Hermon: Will the hon. Gentleman comment on clause 20(4), which makes it clear that any order must relate to criminal proceedings or a criminal investigation? Does that clarify his doubts about which authority he might be requesting the order from?

Nick Hawkins: No, it does not entirely clarify them. I agree with what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said. I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say about the matter, but this part of the Bill would be improved if it were made clear that it was a judicial authority. Of course, I understand the hon. Lady's point.

Bob Ainsworth: I am very pleased that the hon. Gentleman intervened so that I cannot be accused of Lib-Labbery. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome may be on to something worth considering. I do not want to accept his amendment at this point because there may be consequences. Like him, I cannot think of authorities with which we should be co-operating at present. If he will agree to withdraw the amendment, we will consider whether it is an appropriate clarification. If it is, we will table an appropriate amendment to enact his suggestion.

David Heath: I am most grateful to the Under-Secretary for his helpful response. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath should not feel abashed at supporting my amendments on occasion, as I am happy to support his amendments when I agree with them. Having sat through many months in Committee on the Criminal Justice Bill, there were many occasions when Conservative Front Bench Members, myself, my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) and the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Allen) found common ground. One of the interesting results is that almost everything we said during the Bill's passage has now become an announcement by the Home Secretary and is new Government policy.

Nick Hawkins: I am well aware of what the hon. Gentleman says. An interesting new coalition is building up. It is particularly fascinating that it includes the hon. Member for Nottingham, North. If there is one decision in his premiership that the Prime Minister now deeply regrets, I am sure that it was the extraordinary decision to sack him from the Whips Office. It has opened up a subsequent can of worms in terms of his support for some of the things that we have said, which has been useful—

Joe Benton: Order. Let us return to the amendment.

David Heath: Of course, Mr. Benton. I can only say that if we are to act corporately as a think-tank for the Home Office, we are delighted.
 On the basis of the Minister's helpful response, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 135, in
clause 20, page 12, line 29, at end insert— 
 '( ) manifestly correspond with the freezing order'.
 The amendment is fairly simple. It would insert a new condition of 
''manifestly correspond with the freezing order''.
 That is entirely in line with article 7 of the draft framework decision, which sets out the grounds on which a competent judicial authority of the executing state may refuse to apply the freezing order. One of the conditions is that the certificate is not produced, is incomplete or manifestly does not correspond to the freezing order. That enables a freezing order that is clearly wrong to be rejected as such in an early stage in the proceedings, without further complication. There is no obvious reason why that has been left out of the 
 Bill, which is why I am trying to put it back in.

Nick Hawkins: Once again, it is a pleasure to support an amendment tabled by the hon. Gentleman. We think that it is a sensible, helpful change, and I agree with him that the provision should be put back in the Bill. I hope that the Minister's response is as helpful as the one that he gave to the hon. Gentleman's previous amendment.

Bob Ainsworth: I will bring this happy consensus to an end, I think, before it goes too far.
 I am sorry, but I cannot accept the amendment. Freezing orders may be rejected on the ground that the certificate and the freezing order are manifestly incompatible. The wording of the amendment does not represent a requirement under the framework decision. I am satisfied that the point it seeks to address, which is that the order and the certificate must adequately relate to each other, is covered by the current drafting. Subsection (5) contains a requirement for an order to be 
''accompanied by a certificate which gives the specified information''.
 Clause 28(7) defines what the specified information must be. Any information is required to be given in 
''a document annexed to the relevant Framework Decision''.
 That is a reference to the certificate. The reason for that formulation is that the framework decision has not yet been formally adopted. It is clear in the current drafting that the certificate must relate to the freezing order. 
 I am afraid that the consensus has broken down. The amendment is unnecessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome to withdraw it.

David Heath: I hope that the consensus has not broken down irretrievably—I shall cajole the hon. Gentleman back into it.
 I anticipated that the hon. Gentleman would say that the amendment was unnecessary. I have read and reread the relevant clause several times. Clause 20(6) simply says what must be included in the certificate, including 
''a statement as to the accuracy of the information.''
 Information can be completely accurate and still manifestly not correspond to the freezing order—one does not preclude the other. 
 The hon. Gentleman's argument is that we should not include ''from the framework decision'' in the clause, but ''framework decision'' in clause 28(7) will appear in statute. The hon. Gentleman argues that we have not yet signed up to that decision, therefore it should not constitute the basis for the clause, or for my amendment. I do not understand that rather circular argument.

Bob Ainsworth: It is not just the accuracy; the certificate is required to contain the specified information.

David Heath: Indeed, it must contain the specified information, including the offences under investigation, and so forth. However, someone must assess whether that information is factually accurate
 and whether it corresponds to the requested freezing order. That is the dichotomy—
 It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, THE Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.